Book Review: The Law of Trusts by Clark, Elias
REVIEWS
THaE LAW OF TRUSTS. By Austin Wakeman Scott. Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 2d ed., 1956. 5 Volumes, pp. 4056. $100.00.
THERE has never been any doubt as to the standing of Scott on Trusts with
the legal profession. In an Epilogue to both the first and second editions Pro-
fessor Scott, with characteristic conciseness, says of his work: "This, as I
understand it, is the Anglo-American law of trusts."' Because the author is
a distinguished teacher who has spent a lifetime working in the field, it is to
be expected that no one "understands" the subject better. And this has been
the judgment of the profession, as demonstrated by the critical acclaim which
greeted the first edition, the prominent position which these volumes occupy
in the nation's law libraries, and the frequency with which citations to Scott
occur in every decision and brief pertaining to trusts.
Practicing lawyers in particular like what they find here. The author has
culled from the flow of decisions those principles which the courts have treated
as authoritative and has woven them together into orderly patterns. The
result is a set of sourcebooks which are compact, readable and completely re-
liable as to citation of authority. If in the two decades since these volumes
first appeared these qualities of craftsmanship have come to be taken for granted,
the recent publication of a second edition demonstrates anew the author's skill
in synthesizing case materials.
In basic organization, the new edition differs only slightly from its pre-
decessor. There are some twenty or more new sections or subsections. They
seldom, however, introduce new topics. Rather, the arrangement of subjects
has been altered here and there to give, by separation, more emphasis to materials
which previously appeared as parts of other sections. The original four volumes,
three fat and one spare, have now been expanded to five volumes of more uniform
size. The increase results from the updating of the text and footnotes to include
the last twenty years of decisions and statutes. Throughout, the integration
of old and new is achieved without noticeable dislocation, so that while the
new edition has all the good characteristics of the original, it speaks unmistak-
ably from the year 1956.
After reviewing the historical evolution of the trust, Professor Scott opens
the working sections of his treatise with a chapter defining and distinguishing
his subject matter. Once defined, the trust is broken down in successive chapters
into methods of creation, identification of the trust property, trustee and bene-
ficiaries, transfer of interests, administration, liability of parties and termina-
tion. Particular types of trusts are treated as they fit into one of the above
1. 2d ed., p. 3439.
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categories. Only charitable, resulting and constructive trusts are, because of
their nature and importance, given separate chapter headings. 2
The style is well suited to maximize coverage. The sections proceed in order-
ly fashion: first, a statement of the legal principle to be discussed, then a de-
scription of relevant case material, and finally a statement of the author's prefer-
ence if there is a conflict in authority. There is no equivocation. In no more
than a handful of situations is the author without a definition or compelled
to conclude that the law is what the judges say it is.3
Technically, there is little to criticize in his exposition of doctrine. Attention
must therefore be directed to the philosophy underlying his use, selection and
organization of that doctrine. Unlike other writers who treat the traditional
language of the law as only a means-Wigmore, for instance, who wrote to
reform the law of evidence, or Corbin, who found the dynamics of the law of
contracts in the interplay of fact and policy-Scott accepts a clear statement
of doctrine as an end in itself. These volumes are, in short, the Restatement
of Trusts, expanded to include the authority from which the blacldetter prin-
ciples were derived.4
A restatement of the law is an enterprise of bold ambition. If done well,
as in these volumes, its contributions are considerable. Quantitatively, the
property law of trusts is all here. A busy practitioner who has his facts and
claims already assorted can rely on these volumes in the tough task of analyzing
and synthesizing the relevant cases into a form suitable for brief or argument. It
is, however, a paradox of the restatement principle that the very breadth of its
purpose sharply curtails the means whereby that purpose can be achieved. No
one has devised an easy method for collecting the multitude of variables which
go to make up the law. A restatement simply avoids the problem. In order
to satisfy the expectations which it has raised it confines its search for the
law to the single source of reported cases.5
Hence, all the traditional criticisms of a blackletter restatement apply here.6
2. The author suggests that it might be more logical to treat the subject of constructive
trusts elsewhere. He bows, however, to the traditional arrangement and makes it the last
major topic of the treatise. For his reasons, see § 461.
3. For examples of this rare form of frustration, see pp. 321-22 (definition of a
confidential relationship) and p. 520 ("it is impossible to reduce a question of public
policy to a formula."). This is not to suggest that Professor Scott believes only in rigid
categories. Where there is a conflict in authority his preference is invariably in favor
of the more flexible, liberal interpretation. His preference is, however, always consistent
with his previous statement of the applicable rule.
4. The section numbers correspond with the section numbers of the Restatement of
Trusts. The materials on constructive trusts appear in the Restatement of Restitution.
The author provides a table of cross references at p. 3099. Professor Scott was, of
course, the reporter of the Trust Restatement and of those sections of the Restitution
Restatement which pertain to trusts.
5. Except in some areas of trust administration, statutes are relatively unimportant
as a source of trust law.
6. The type of criticism made herein is practically as old as the first restatement.
The most comprehensive presentation of a restatement's deficiences appears in McDougal,
19571
HeinOnline -- 66 Yale L.J. 809 1956-1957
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
It must, of necessity, be deficient because it accepts at face the language courts
use to justify their decisions, with only incidental reference to the factors which
persuaded the court to make that decision in the first place. Professor Scott
anticipates this line of criticism. He warns that language alone does not con-
trol and that there are dangers in being overly conceptualistic. 7 He proceeds,
nonetheless, without too much care for his admonitions.
The chapter on definitions and distinctions, for example, presents a bewilder-
ing array of cases ranging far and wide throughout the law. Some involve lia-
bility, others construction of instruments, the statute of limitations or juris-
diction of courts. The author does not categorize these problems by their facts,
the claims made by the parties or the policies which might be relevant. His
groupings depend on the label-trust, bailment, agency, equitable charge and
the like-by which cQurts have traditionally explained their decisions. As these
cases themselves demonstrate, the label does not actually determine the results;
it is at most an alternative way of stating the problem to be decided. Thus, in
section 5 it is stated that a trust is not a bailment because the trustee has legal
title (a bailee mere possession), a trustee can convey title to a bona fide pur-
chaser (a bailee cannot), and a trustee is suable in equity (a bailee elsewhere).
An obvious question is whether these characteristics identify the category or
whether they are the consequences which follow after the identification has
previously been made. Scott suggests that ultimately the basis of distinction
is to be found in the intent of the parties. "If [the transferor] ... manifested
an intention to transfer the title and not merely possession, a trust is created;
if to give possession merely, a bailment is created." The intent test is scarcely
less ambiguous. The transferor either did not have an intent or it cannot re-
liably be found. The court must therefore construct his intent with the result
that intent is as much in issue as the label which the intent is supposed to sup-
ply. The author, while he would certainly not go as far, does concede that in
close cases intent is a matter of "guess."
In certain areas of trust law, doctrine does play a vital, even controlling, role
in the decision-making process. This happens in cases involving the allocation
of principal and income. The issues are capable of being narrowly defined.
There are only a certain, relatively small, number of forms that a receipt of
property can take, and these forms can be determined rather arbitrarily by
referring to a few external characteristics. The trend of decision and statute,
in frank pursuit of a policy of administrative convenience and regularity, has
been toward formalizing the methods of allocation even to the extent that ap-
Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HAv. L. REv.
1077 (1942). On the Restatement of Trusts see Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of
Trusts, 31 CoLtrm. L. REv. 800 (1931), and Professor Scott's reply, 31 COLui. L. Rzv.
1266 (1931). On how a restatement evolves, see Clark, The Restatement of the Law of
Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643 (1933).
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parent injustice has resulted in individual cases.' 0 Professor Scott's analysis
is admirably suited to present this material."' Indeed, it may well be that in
this area he has had his greatest influence in clarifying and shaping the law.
As doctrine seeks to generalize for an infinite number of fact situations, it
becomes illusive as a guide. Trust law provides one of the most dramatic ex-
amples of the unreliability of legal abstractions as a basis for solving concrete
cases. A recurring challenge to the judicial process has been the transfer de-
signed to give away property while retaining all its practical benefits. The
rule, briefly stated, is that the transfer is valid if the transferor divested himself
of dominion and control. The cases, however, indicate that the rule is empty
of meaning without reference to the persons who invoke it. In Newman v.
Dore,1 2 for instance, the New York Court of Appeals held an inter vivos trust
ineffective as a means of disinheriting the wife. But the court conceded that
the same trust might be valid as to persons claiming in any other capacity,
although the test of validity did not admit to such variations. This case, unique
only in that the controlling facts and policies were so apparent, suggests the
minimum discriminations which must be made if the process of adjudication
is to be accurately described.
Experience shows that even a breakdown into facts and policies is only a
start. For almost thirty years the New York courts have sought a rule to
protect the spouse from disinheritance by trust transfers which pass title and
nothing much else. Congress, the Treasury and the federal courts have grappled
with a somewhat similar problem in extending the reach of the estate tax to
include trusts measured by the transferor's life. In both instances, the prob-
lems, although narrowly defined, have defied solution. The bold promise which
for the New York spouse was contained in Newman v. Dore 13 and for the
federal tax commissioner in Helvering v. Hallock 14 has degenerated into the
confusion typified respectively by Matter of Halpern 15 and section 2037 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Certainty, it would seem, cannot be found
short of the most minute itemization of facts, claims, policies, competence and
prejudices of judges, and the like.
The text provides other examples. The sections on the declaration of
trusts,16 construction of precatory language,17 evasion of the Statute of Frauds,'8
10. The presence of a discretionary allocation clause does not appreciably change this
result. The trustee still tends to follow recognized forms of allocation in order to establish
the reasonableness of his conduct.
11. §§ 232-41A.
12. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), discussed and approved in the text, pp. 471-73.
13. Ibid.
14. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
15. 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951), discussed and disapproved in the text, pp.
498-501.
16. §§ 17.1, 23, 24, 56.6.
17. § 25.
18. §§ 44, 45.
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the active-passive dichotomy,' 9 the insurance trust,20 termination and modifi-
cation,21 the trust res,22 and the nature of a charitable gift 23 often reveal the
same confusion of facts, claims, policies, labels and results. In fairness to Pro-
fessor Scott it must be noted that he frequently speaks of the difficulty in gen-
eralizing the law.24 But this insight is not pursued in specific terms. His trust
emerges simple, neat and disciplined. The aberrations noted are rather sum-
marily excused. In contrast to this image is the evolution of the trust as an
outlaw, a device permitting property owners to make wills and avoid taxes in
defiance of the laws of the time. Although the ensuing centuries have given
the trust a measure of respectability, they have not kept it from frequently re-
verting to type. Property owners use the trust for an infinite variety of reasons,
some not so nice. Courts, in much the same manner, talk trusts as a means of
justifying results which the law would not otherwise allow. It is this unlimited
availibility of the trust which makes it so illusive to those who would restate it.
The law's complexity is the principal casualty of the author's analysis. But
in at least two other respects the trust does not receive its full due. First, its
institutional significance is largely ignored. To measure the trust's utility ex-
clusively in legal terms is to overlook its vital contributions to the economy,
the family, private philanthropy and society in general. Second, case materials
do not sufficiently emphasize the trust's capacity to grow and adapt. In the
sections on investments, for instance, all the traditional rules are set out in
detail. 2 5 What does not clearly emerge is the really exciting story of an institu-
tion, sorely challenged, responding and growing to meet that challenge. In a
very real sense the last few decades have seen a revolution in trust practices as
fundamental as any since the enactment of the Statute of Uses. Wars, de-
pressions, inflation and taxes have brought about a thorough reappraisal of
traditional assumptions about investments. Old rules have given way as more
flexible devices have evolved. Out of it all has come a transformation of the
trustee's office from an easy sinecure to an exacting job requiring skill and
careful attention.
In short, these books are a boon to the lawyer who is always in search
for the one case which will mean victory. For the rest, scholars and students,
something is missing. If trust law is "living law," as Professor Scott asserts
both at the beginning and end of his monumental work,20 then the vital spark
of life and growth has often eluded him.
ELIAS CLARKt
19. §§ 67-70.




24. Pp. 243, 2629.
25. §§ 227-227.16.
26. Preface to the Second Edition, and Epilogue, p. 3440.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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